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CONSUMERISM. Edited by David A. Aaker & George S. Day.
New York, New York: The Free Press. 1971. Pp. xx, 442. $4.95.
Consumer protection law has recently become a popular area of
study among the increasingly idealistic and activist students in the
law school community. But courses such as consumer protection law
should not be considered a temporary submission to student cries for
"relevance." The primary purpose of a professional school is to
offer its students the knowledge and skills required in the practice of
the profession, and certainly the law relating to the consumer is rele-
vant in this regard. Furthermore, consumer law is as intellectually
challenging and as susceptible to legal reasoning as the more tradi-
tional subjects in the curriculum. Also, there is much to be said
for the frequent suggestion that if one of the primary, if not
exclusive, functions of law school is to develop legal skills of anal-
ysis, the topics analyzed need not be exclusively business oriented.
Finally, with the increasing opportunities for lawyers to repre-
sent the victims - as well as the beneficiaries - of the "dark side
of the marketplace" 1 a fair number of our students find immediate
practical use for a course in consumer protection.
As is usually true of new subjects, one of the critical problems is
finding, in a digestible form, the written materials from which to ac-
quire the necessary knowledge and skills. Unfortunately, those
books most quickly rushed to print are not entirely satisfactory.2 In
the field of consumer protection, the only currently published mate-
rials designed for teaching law students are a casebook on consumer
credit by Professor Homer Kripke, a 107-page pamphlet on consumer
credit by Professor William F. Young, Jr., and two pamphlets in the
Foundation Press Social Justice Through Law Series - New Ap-
proaches in the Law of Contracts by Professor Marion W. Benfield,
Jr., and New Approaches in the Law of Civil Procedure by Professor
Herbert Semmel. All these materials show signs of the haste in
which they were prepared and published. None pretends to cover
all of the topics that would be included in even a narrow definition
of consumer protection. The two pamphlets by Benfield and Sem-
1 W. MAGNUSON & J. CARPER, THE DARK SIDE OF THE MARKET PLACE (1968).
2 See, e.g., Junger, Book Review, 22 CAsE W. REs. L REV. 598 (1971) (an unfavor-
able review by Professor Junger of the first casebook in Environmental Law).
3 Materials have also been published for teaching legal services attorneys, but these
are now out of print and not generally available.
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23: 223
mel, when read together, cover many of the most important topics.
However, these pamphlets were designed to be included as part of
the first year courses in contracts and civil procedure. The mate-
rials they include, while excellently chosen and arranged, are not
sufficiently nourishing for a separate course. Professor Kripke's
justly praised book is largely devoted to problems of consumer
credit.4
Some subjects, clearly within any comprehensive definition of
consumer protection, are either ignored or merely touched upon
in the law school materials just mentioned. Examples include the
law of warranties; the regulation of advertising, packaging, and la-
beling; and the regulation of product safety and performance stan-
dards. There is a partial explanation for these omissions. Warran-
ties are often given extensive treatment in the course on sales or
commercial transactions and some schools give independent courses
in the increasingly important subject of product liability.5 But the
most frequent complaint of the consumer - middle-class and poor
alike - is that the goods they purchase often fall apart or don't work
and, as a practical matter, there is little they can do about it. Such
problems are generally given little attention in the typical commer-
cial law courses. Furthermore, the revitalized Federal Trade Com-
mission (FTC) and the strengthened Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) have become increasingly active in many areas of consumer
protection, and recently an effort has been made to establish an in-
dependent federal consumer agency6 which would ultimately con-
solidate most of the federal consumer protection programs.' Similar
agencies have become active in a number of states and cities. More
attention than is found in either the Kripke book or the other ma-
terials should be given to these developments and their potential
future impact. Perhaps it is unfair to criticize the editors of the
consumer credit books for not covering non-credit topics. But the
point is that none of these materials is sufficiently comprehensive
4 H. KRIPKE, CONSUMER CREDIT (1970). This book is favorably reviewed in
Miller, Book Review, 56 IowA L. REV. 716 (1971); Felsenfeld, Book Review, 26 Bus.
LAWYER 1369 (1971).
5 An excellent new casebook, P. KEETON & M. SHAPO, PRODUCTS AND THE CON-
SUMER: DEFECrIvE AND DANGEROUS PRODUCTS (1970), gives comprehensive treat-
ment to products safety and products liability law.
6 See, e.g., S. 4459 & H.R. 18214, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). For more recent ef-
forts see N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1971, at 19, col. 2.
'Since 1964 there has been a Special Assistant to the President for Consumer Af-
fairs, but the office carries little authority. There are at least 39 official agencies with
significant responsibilities in consumer matters. See CONG. Q., Nov. 21, 1969, at 2351.
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for someone interested in the law relating to "consumerism." And
whatever their merits, none is of much utility without the benefit of
classroom work and a knowledgeable teacher.
These books and pamphlets do raise the important legal, eco-
nomic, and social issues affecting consumer credit, but they neither
resolve them nor do they give a systematic picture of the present
state of the law. The Kripke book in particular has been justly
praised for its balanced presentation of the current issues involved in
consumer credit, especially the economic issues.8 Of course, most
worthwhile books edited for law school teaching are designed to
provoke thought and emphasize policy questions somewhat at the
expense of the current law. This is especially true in a subject as
diverse, complex and rapidly changing as consumer credit law.
Thus, it would be impossible to teach each state's law and it would
make little sense to teach the existing law, since the law that stu-
dents will face in practice will be much changed.
Most consumer credit law is regulated by state statute. There is
much in the way of doctrine and structure common to most of the
states, and the Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968' imposed an
important degree of uniformity in the form of a national standard
of disclosure for consumer interest rates. In addition, many aspects
of consumer transactions are governed by the Uniform Commercial
Code (UCC). However, the UCC allows for diversity among the
states on many of the most critical consumer issues,", and many
states have passed legislation superceding parts of the UCC which
govern consumer transactions." While most states have some form
of a retail installment sales act and small loan legislation, there is
more diversity than uniformity among the states with regard to inter-
est rates, licensing requirements, regulation of the terms of consumer
8 See book reviews cited in note 4 supra.
9 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-77 (Supp. IV, 1968). The CoNsuMER CREDIT PROTECION
Act OF 1968 [hereinafter cited as CCPA], also restricts garnishments and several other
less significant matters. The federal law completely controls garnishments only insofar
as it is more restrictive than the prevailing state law in all respects. Hodgson v. Cleve-
land Municipal Court, 326 F. Supp. 419 (N.D. Ohio 1971). See 15 U.S.C. § 1677
(Supp. IV, 1968). Since many states restrict garnishments at least in some respects more
than the CCPA, it would seem that uniformity among the states is only partial.
-
0 E.g., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-206 (the validity of waiver of defense
clauses) [hereinafter cited as U.C.C.]; U.C.C. § 2-318 (the persons to whom implied
warranties run).
"1 See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1801.0-12.1 (West Supp. 1971); MAss. GEN. ANN.
LAWS ch. 255D, §§ 1-32 (Supp. 1971).
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sales and loan agreements or, for that matter, any other aspect of
consumer credit.12
Indeed, within a single state a rational pattern of legislation sel-
dom exists. In nearly every state consumer credit regulation has
evolved sporadically as a response to a particular problem or need.13
Once enacted, each piece of legislation encourages the rise of institu-
tions which soon develop vested interests in the status quo and dis-
courage later fundamental change. As a result, the consumer credit
market is greatly segmented, and there is little uniformity in the
treatment of functionally similar transactions. For instance, if a con-
sumer wishes to purchase a new air conditioner but doesn't have the
cash, he might be able to borrow money from a bank, a small loan
company, a Morris Plan Bank, a credit union or any number of other
financial institutions. In each case the maximum rate of interest es-
tablished by law, the officials responsible for regulating the lending
institution, and the other aspects of regulation are likely to be differ-
ent. Alternatively, the consumer might open a regular charge ac-
count with the seller and agree to pay within a certain time. He
might charge the purchase on a revolving charge account operated
by the seller. He might charge the purchase by using a third-party
credit card, issued by a bank or an independent credit card company.
He may even enter into an installment loan agreement with the
seller, with or without an accompanying note, and the seller may in
turn assign the contract and note to a consumer finance company or
a bank. In each of these cases the consumer gets his air conditioner
on credit, but the law regulating the credit aspects of each transac-
tion will be subject to different statutory and administrative regula-
tion, or non-regulation. This is true even though functionally, and
from the consumer's point of view, all or nearly all of the transac-
tions are the same.
Professor Kripke avoids this morass to some extent by utilizing
the provisions of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code (UCCC) as a
model for rational and systematic consumer credit regulation. 14
While the UCCC has been severely criticized and seems to have no
chance of gaining the degree of acceptance of the UCC, it does pro-
12See B. CURRAN, TRENDS IN CONSUMER CREDIT LEGISLATION 158-329 (1965)
where the statutes as of January 1, 1966 have been compared.
13 See generally Curran, Legislative Controls As A Response To Consumer Credit
Problems, AM. BAR FOUNDATION RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS, No. 1 (1968).
14 The UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE [hereinafter cited as U.C.C.C.], was
drafted and, on 1968, approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws. The UCCC was approved by the American Bar Association in 1968
but has been adopted only in Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, Oklahoma, Utah and Wyoming.
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vide a touchstone for travel through the murky waters of state legisla-
tion. The principal rival of the UCCC, the National Consumer
Act' (NCA) drafted by Professor Williar and the National Con-
sumer Law Institute, has a distinctively more pro-consumer orienta-
tion than does the UCCC and is frequently used by Professor Kripke
for comparison.
While all of the materials discussed are useful in sorting out the
policy issues, and while Kripke has at least a comprehensive model
statute to study, none of the books give much guidance as to the
current state of the law in the various jurisdictions. Curran's monu-
mental book, Trends in Consumer Credit Legislation,'8 is helpful in
this regard with its many charts and tables comparing the statutes of
various states, but much has happened since January 1, 1965, the last
date she used for comparison purposes. Practitioners and others
seeking current statutes in the 50 states can keep abreast through one
of the Consumer Credit Services, such as that published by Commerce
Clearing House. 7
But even this picture is incomplete because the courts have re-
cently taken a more active role in the reform and regulation of con-
sumer credit practices. The most familiar and influential examples
are Unico v. Owen, 8 Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. of Bay-
view,'" and Williams v. Walker Thomas Furniture Co.20 In Unico,
the New Jersey Supreme Court held invalid as unconscionable a
waiver of defense clause in a retail installment contract and refused
to grant holder in due course status to a consumer finance company
which had some knowledge of the questionable behavior of its as-
signor.2 ' In Sniadach the United States Supreme Court held that
Wisconsin's prejudgment wage garnishment procedure violated due
process. Williams was one of the first cases in which a court exer-
cised its powers under section 2-302 of the UCC to invalidate
25 The NATIONAL CoNsUMER ACT (First Final Draft, 1970) [hereinafter cited as
N.C.A., is available from the National Consumer Law Center, Boston College Law
School, Brighton, Massachusetts. The Kripke book contains neither the UCC nor the
NCA.
16 B. CURRAN, supra note 12.
17 E.g., CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GuiDE REP. This reporter is limited to credit
legislation.
18 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967).
19 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
20 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cit. 1965).
2 1 Even though the instruments in Unico were executed before the effective date of
the UCC, the case was decided upon code principles.
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contracts or contract terms found "unconscionable."22 Except for
Sniadach, which is based upon the Federal Constitution, the au-
thority of these cases in other jurisdictions is questionable. Al-
though none establishes a new principle, they all represent important
steps in the movement towards legal reform in the consumer area.
Thus, the developing case law seems to add another layer of com-
plexity to the maze of laws throughout the states. Consequently,
any statement of what the law is becomes more uncertain, and the
study of what should be happening in the law, rather than what has
happened, becomes more useful to the legal profession as the pace
of development increases.
The more rapidly the law develops, the faster any book becomes
obsolete.23  Professor Kripke's book has anticipated much of this
development and seems to be holding up well. For instance, it now
appears clear that the holder in due course doctrine and the waiver
of defenses clause in consumer credit transactions are both finished
or soon will be. The combined attack of the courts, 24 the FTC,25
and the state legislatures" will soon make the issue academic in the
case of assignments. The important battleground of the future will
involve direct loans and credit cards. Should the consumer who
borrows from a bank or small loan company in order to buy an air
conditioner have any right to stop his bank payments if the air con-
ditioner ceases to work ?27 Does it make any difference that the sales-
man escorted the consumer to the bank and helped him fill out the
forms? If the purchase had been made using a credit card can the
consumer stop those payments if the air conditioner stops working ?28
2 Williams was also a pre-Code application of the UCC.
23 One reviewer has suggested, half in jest, that Kripke should have provided daily
supplements. Felsenfeld, supra note 4, at 1372.
24 See, e.g., Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967).
2
5See, e.g., proposed FTC Reg. § 433.1, 36 Fed. Reg. 1211 (1971).
2 6 See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 255D, § 25A (Supp. 1971). See also
Brandel & Leonard, Bank Charge Cards: New Cash or New Credit?, 69 MIcL L. REv.
1033, 1055 n.73 (1971), where the authors have listed the 30 state statutes which affect
third party freedom from defenses.
27 The answer is no except in Massachusetts. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 225,
§ 12F (Supp. 1971) (creditor subject to all defenses of borrower if he "knowingly
participated in or was directly connected with the consumer sale or lease transaction").
See generally Littlefield, Preserving Consumer Defenses: Plugging the Loophole in the
New UCCC, 44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 272 (1969). The UCCC would not change this but
section 2.407 of the NCA would.
28 The agreement between the cardholder and card issuer always contains a waiver
of defenses clause. Ordinarily the terms of such agreements would be enforceable sub-
ject to the unconscionability test (although the direct applicability of U.C.C. § 2-302 is
questionable). There are no reported cases raising the issue. Brandel & Leonard, supra
note 26, at 1040. New York is considering legislation that would allow the credit card
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Professor Kripke in his extensive section on third party freedom
from defenses discussesthe direct loan problem, although he under-
rates its importance. Here the problems of policy are more difficult
and the problems of legislative drafting and judicial line-drawing
more troublesome than in the case of assignments. Professor Kripke
anticipates some of these questions, although, as is generally true of
all the materials discussed, too little attention is given to the increas-
ingly important credit card.29
These prefatory remarks should demonstrate that, despite all the
literature currently available, no book comes close to exhausting the
field of consumer protection. The student, teacher, practicing law-
yer, and policymaker who seeks a comprehensive picture of the whole
range of problems of consumer protection cannot depend upon one
or two books. The serious researcher can supplement his reading
with the large number of available law review articles and several
symposia80 which cover the whole range of consumer problems.
While there is much repetition and not all articles are first rate, the
general quality is high. The problem is that there is too much mate-
rial for anyone to become educated in the whole range of problems
without a great deal of time and someone to collect the best material
in each topic.
Some assistance is found in an anthology of articles collected
and edited by Carol Katz, as part of the New York University Pro-
ject on Social Welfare Law.' The Katz book contains an extensive
bibliography of articles and materials not included in the anthology.
Although the book was designed for use by poverty lawyers and fo-
cuses upon the problems of the poor, it still has general importance,
since various classes of consumers share many of the same problems.
Its limitations are threefold. First, it was published in 1968 and
much has transpired since then. For example, some of the most im-
portant activity of the FTC has taken place in the last two years and
the UCCC, the proposed Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act, and
much of the state reform legislation came too late to receive atten-
holder to raise as defenses claims arising out of the sales transaction. See N.Y. Times,
Sept. 2, 1971, at 47, col. 2. A recent Massachusetts statute may do the same thing.
See MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 225, § 12 F (Supp.. 1971).
29 The excellent article by Brandel & Leonard, supra note 26, is a welcome addi-
tion to the curiously small number of articles dealing with credit cards.
3 0 See e.g., four symposiums on consumer protection appearing in 8 B.C. IND. &
Com. L REV. 387 (1967); 33 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoB. 639 (1968); 64 MrcL L
REV. 1197 (1966); 44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1 (1969).
31C. KATz, THE LAW AND THE LOW INCOME CONSUMER (1968).
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tion in the Katz anthology." Second, the sources are all from legal
journals and many of the articles deal only with law in the narrow
sense. Finally, a 400 page book of selected articles must necessarily
omit much important material.
As previously mentioned, one of the limitations of the Katz book
is that it was primarily written by lawyers for lawyers. For
many years law schools have been criticized for not incorporating
sufficient non-legal materials into the law school curriculum, and
for not making use of the scholarly contributions of economists, so-
ciologists, psychologists and others.33  In the new field of consumer
protection that criticism is largely unjustified, in part because change
in the field is so rapid that policy - what should be as opposed to
what is - has been all important. Many policy matters in the field
ultimately become questions of values and problems of reconciling
conflicting interests, areas about which no discipline has any special
claim to expertise. Before reaching these value judgments, however,
it is necessary to know a great deal about our socio-economic insti-
tutions, consumer behavior, and applied economic theory.
For instance, we have for centuries attempted to regulate the
maximum rates of interest at which credit can be granted.34 While
the initial reason for regulation was religious, today's usury laws
are judged from the viewpoint of social and economic policy.35 The
present weight of knowledgeable opinion recommends that we de-
pend primarily upon competition to regulate the price of credit, just
as we depend upon competition to regulate the price of goods.30 This
opinion is essentially based upon economic theory and history. First,
theory and practice tell us that competition which is allowed to
operate freely will work to control prices of both goods and
credit. Second, in an economy in which the profit motive deter-
mines investment decisions, credit will be extended only when the
return will be sufficient to pay the cost of money, the overhead costs
of administering the credit granting institution, the cost of collection
32 See H. KRIPKE, supra note 4, at 262, where the not yet approved second working
draft of the UNIFORM CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES Acr can be found.
3 3 See, e.g., Haskell, Some Thoughts About our Law Schools, 56 GEO. L.J. 897
(1968).
34 See Bernstein, Backgrojand of a Grey Area in Law: The Checkered Career of Usury,
51 A.B.A.J. 846 (1965).
35 E.g., Benfield, Money, Mortgages and Migraine - The Usury Headache, 19
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 819 (1968); Jorday & Warren, The Uniform Consumer Credit
Code, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 387 (1968); Shay, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code: An
Economist's View, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 491 (1969).
36 See, e.g., Johnson, Rate Competition, 26 Bus. LAWYER 777 (1971).
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or the risk of uncollectability, and still provide some increment of
profit. We know that it costs more to extend credit to poor people
because a smaller loan is proportionately more expensive to admini-
ster than a larger loan and there are greater risks in collecting from
poor people. The greater risks encountered with the poor do not
stem from any recalcitrance, but rather from an inability to pay,37
which often has its origin in poor health and fluctuating job oppor-
tunities. With few assets any minor setback becomes a major dis-
aster.
Thus, any maximum interest rate which is realistic for the poor
would be irrelevant as applied to the middle class. And any maxi-
mum interest rate which is realistic as applied to the middle class
would effectively bar the poor from all legal channels of credit. This
would result in either the poor's receiving no credit - which means
no major appliances, automobiles or other durable goods - or the
development of a black market for credit in the form of loan
sharks.38
Clearly, the first alternative of eliminating consumer credit for
the poor would place a damper on our economy. It is uncertain
whether consumer credit makes our economy more volatile or
whether it instead has a counter-cyclical effect. 9 In any case, there
is little chance that we would purposely cut off the poor from all
participation in our consumer economy.
And it is also dear that the regulatory force of competition has
been reduced by the establishment of maximum interest rates, restric-
tive licensing and limitations on the types of credit any one institution
can grant. But competition depends upon more than just freedom
of entry for the suppliers of credit. If consumers are uninformed or
misinformed as to the costs of credit 40 or if our institutional and
consumer behavior fails to fit our theoretical models,41 then the
regulatory effect of competition is also diminished.
3 7 See, e.g., Note, Resort to the Legal Process in Collecting Debts from High Risk
Credit Buyers in Los Angeles - Alternative Methods for Allocating Present Costs, 14
U.C.LA.L REV. 878, 894 (1967). This conclusion was reached on the basis of inter-
views with representatives of creditors.
38 The unattractiveness of these two alternatives is the usual reason given to explain
the UCCCs unusually high maximum interest rates. See, e.g., Johnson, Regulation
of Finance Charges on Consumer Installment Credit, 66 MICH. L. REV. 81 (1968); Shay,
The Uniform Consumer Credit Code: An Economist's View, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 491
(1969).
39 See Installment Credit, 7 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL ScI-
ENCES 354 (1968).
4 0 See U.CC.C. § 2.201, comment 1.
4 1 See Shay, A Portrait of the Consumer Credit Market, 26 Bus. LAWYER 761
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The above analysis of one of the most important issues of con-
sumer credit basically depends upon an examination of economic
theory and history, social anthropology, and empirical studies. In
the area of rate regulation the lawyers and the legislatures concerned
with consumer protection have recently had considerable guidance
from economists. Professor Kripke, to his credit, has included a
great deal of non-legal economic material in his book, and even the
law reviews have allowed the economists to invade their sacred
pages. 42
The study of most other areas of consumer protection, such as
regulation of advertising and safety standards, and standardization
of packaging, must also rely on the contributions of non-lawyers.
The most significant contribution to understanding the consumer
problems of the poor unquestionably comes from empirical studies
such as the pioneering work of David Caplovitz, The Poor Pay
More,43 and the Federal Trade Commission's study of installment
sales practices in the District of Columbia.44
The need for economic theory, empirical studies and an under-
standing of business practice has been well-recognized by everyone
involved with consumer protection - the scholars,45 the regulatory
agencies,4" and the courts.47 Consequently it was with great interest
and anticipation that I read Consumerism, described as "the first or-
ganized collection of critical articles dealing with the activities of
government, business, and independent organizations in the field of
consumer interest. ' 48  The authors, Aaker and Day, are professors
in the business schools of the University of California at Berkeley
(1971); White & Munger, Consumer Sensitivity to Interest Rates: An Empirical Study
of New-Car Buyers and Auto Loans, 69 MIcH. L. REV. 1207 (1971). The UCCC
would break down the barriers of competition and allow unusually high interest rates.
42 See Johnson, supra notes 36 & 38. See also Shay, supra note 41.
43 D. CAPLOVITZ, THE POOR PAY MORE (1963).
44 FTC, ECONOMIC REPORT ON INSTALLMENT CREDIT AND RETAIL SALES PRAC-
TICES OF DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA RETAILERS (1968). One significant conclusion
reached by this study is that the merchants in low income neighborhoods charge high
prices but their profits are no higher than other merchants' profits.
45 In addition to articles already cited supra notes 36, 38 & 41, see Birmingham,
The Consumer as King: The Economics of Precarious Sovereignty, 20 CASE W. RES.
L. REv. 354 (1969); and articles found in Part III, Consumer Protection, 23 J. LEG. ED.
151 (1971). In particular see the skeptical article by Dunham, Empiricism, Law Reform
and Consumer Protection, 23 J. LEG. ED. 153 (1971).
4 6 See, e.g., FTC, supra note 44.
47 The testimony of David Caplovitz, author of The Poor Pay More, played an im-
portant part in a recent case involving cognovit notes. See Swath v. Lennox, 314 F.
Supp. 1091 (E.D. Penn. 1970).
48 D. AAKER & G. DAY, CONSUMERISM (1971) (back cover of book) [hereinafter
cited as AAKER & DAY].
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and Stanford University, respectively. They have assembled 35 ar-
ticles, primarily from business journals, dealing with various aspects
of consumer protection. For all of the contributions made by the
economists and others, too little attention has been given by lawyers
interested in consumer protection to the motives, thought patterns,
and practices of businessmen. The viewpoints of businessmen and
business scholars should provide a useful perspective in the anal-
ysis of various consumer issues. I had hoped that Professors Aaker
and Day would partially fill this void, but unfortunately my hope
was largely unfulfilled.
In their introduction "A Guide to Consumerism," the editors
attempt to give an overall picture of the complaints of today's con-
sumer and to outline some of the causes of his increasingly vocal
discontent.49  Although the discussion is at times unclear and it
overemphasizes the importance of the single word "consumerism,"
Aaker and Day are reasonably successful in pinpointing the causes
of the heightened awareness of our society to consumer complaints.
These causes are basically: (1) the increasingly impersonal naturt-
of the mass marketplace; (2) the rising expectations and impatience
of the general public which is exacerbated by exaggerated advertising
claims; (3) the rapid technological changes which place the con-
sumer at the mercy of machines that produce complicated and fragile
products which are not fully understood; and (4) the effectiveness
of consumer protection advocates such as Ralph Nader.
The introduction also touches upon some points which are
ignored in the body of the book. For instance, the editors mention
that antitrust policies, insofar as they help to maintain competition
among suppliers, are of fundamental importance to the protection of
the consumer.50  The only other discussion of antitrust matters is a
misleading and unoriginal defense of retail price maintenance.51
The editors also mention the consumer dass action as one of the
developing legal techniques which will have a significant impact
upon business practice. The proposed consumer class action legis-
lation introduced in the last Congress52 raised a great deal of
controversy. Some idea of the importance of this procedural device
is evidenced by the vehemence with which the business community
491d. at 7.
50 Id. at 6.
51 Levitt, Branding on Trial, in AAKER & DAY 107. The title is misleading. The
function of branding is more skillfully discussed by Bauer & Greyser, The Dialogue that
Never Happens, in AAKER & DAY 59, 64.
52 S. 1980, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
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opposed this legislationY3  One consumer spokesman has even stated
that "a really sound class-action statute would be worth all of the
rest of the consumer legislation put together." And yet the articles
do not consider the matter.
The editors view current consumer problems as divisible into
three broad categories: (1) "protection against clear-cut abuses;"
(2) "provision for adequate information;" and (3) "protection of
the consumers against themselves and other consumers." 55  They
correctly consider the first category as neither new nor particularly
controversial. Few would say that notions of freedom of contract,
individual liberty or anything else should bar governmental action
against the proverbial salesman of the Brooklyn Bridge. An ex-
cerpt from Senator Warren Magnuson and Jean Carper's book, The
Dark Side of the Marketplace (found in the book's "selling practice"
section, and worth reading if only to appreciate the sophistication
of today's merchant swindlers) describes some of the recent flagrant
frauds. The problem here lies not so much in the law as in the en-
forcement of the law. Like mugging, it is dearly immoral and illegal,
but not easily prevented. This is not to say it is always easy to draw
the line between permissible puffing and fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion.5 6 Nor is it easy to draft a workable and legally enforceable
statute to effectively prohibit such elusive practices as the bait and
switch.57 In addition, it is difficult to get local prosecutors, who are
understandably preoccupied with crimes of violence, to expend the
time and effort to enforce the antifraud laws that exist. A partial
solution might lie in an adequately manned FTC with expanded
jurisdiction that would work with similar agencies in each state and
major urban area.58 In any event, the editors wisely devote little
time to this aspect of consumer protection.
53 See, e.g., 1970 CONG. Q. ALA. 616-20.
54 N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1971, at 55, col. 6. In assessing the quote from James T.
Prendergast, Director of the New York Legal Aid Society, one should understand that
New York has an unusually limited class action procedure by vitue of the recent case of
Hall v. Cobrun Corp. of Am., 26 N.Y.2d 396, 259 N.E.2d 720, 311 N.Y.S.2d 893
(1970). Other states are more liberal. See, e.g., Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 167 Cal. 2d
695, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1967). Both Kripke and Young have materials
dealing with class actions, but their materials are insufficient to provide full understand-
ing of the difficulties and possibilities of this superficially simple device.
5 5 AAKER & DAY 3.
56 See U.C.C. § 2-313, comment 8.
57 See In re Household Sewing Machine Co. v. FTC. [1967-1970 Transfer Binder]
TRADE REG. RBP. 5 18,882 at 21,214 (FTC 1969).
58 Many states have recently created separate agencies or divisions in the state at-
torney's office to handle consumer matters. A number of cities, most notably New York,
have done the same.
BOOK COMMENT
The editors' second category, "provision for adequate informa-
tion," is given the most attention in the articles selected, which is
fortunate since the materials discussed earlier say little about this
aspect of consumer protection. Included is an excerpt from Pro-
fessor Kripke's article expressing his well-founded opinion that the
Federal Truth in Lending Act is of minimal value. 9 It is now
generally recognized that honest and uniform disclosure of interest
rates, while undeniably a healthy reform, is basically middle-class
legislation which solves few problems. The other articles within
this category deal with advertising, labeling, and packaging.
The contribution by E. G. Weiss, a columnist for Advertising
Age and one of the few authors whose background is identified,
consists principally of an exhortation to Madison Avenue to dean
its own house.60 Basically he wants advertising people to: (1) tone
down exaggerated and meaningless claims, since the consumer has
become sufficiently sophisticated and cynical to destroy advertising's
credibility; and (2) eliminate the sex element which is offensive
to many customers. The valuable part of the Weiss artide is a long
quotation from a talk given by Clarence E. Eldridge, the man in
charge of advertising for General Foods. Mr. Eldridge suggests
that people consciously react to only a small portion of advertising
and that a third of those persons reacting do so negatively. Because
the products of various manufacturers are substantially the same, and
because advertising is not successful in misleading the consumer into
believing that differences exist, Mr. Eldridge asserts that manufac-
turers are forced to rely extensively upon promotions and off-price
specials (i.e., price competition). If what Mr. Eldridge says is
true,0' it has great significance for understanding monopolistic com-
petition and merits consideration in determining the manner and
scope of advertising regulation.
More familiar to the lawyer interested in consumer protection is
Gaylord A. Jentz's general review of the history of federal regu-
lation of advertising and his description of representative FTC
cases.62  But any student of consumer protection would do better
to skip Jentz's article and read the Harvard Law Review Note which
5 9 Kripke, Gesture and Reality in Consumer Credit Reform, 44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1
(1969). Reaching the same conclusion is Note, Truth in Lending: The Impossible
Dream, 22 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 89 (1970).
6 0 Weiss, Advertising's Crisis of Confidence, in AAKE & DAY 123.
61 Mr. Eldridge's statistics came from an American Association of Advertising Agen-
des study.
62 Jentz, Federal Regulation in Advertising, in AAKER & DAY 133.
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he cites.' Both, however, are somewhat out-of-date. Also out-of-
date are Dorothy Cohen's mild criticisms of the FTC.64 The Com-
mission has recently been the subject of much more thorough and
biting criticism by an American Bar Association Commission, 65 one
of Ralph Nader's teams,66 and a Presidential Advisory Council.6 I
Moreover although the FTC has been the subject of numerous crit-
ical studies in the past, the latest attacks seem to have revitalized the
Commission."8
The problem of deceptive packaging and labeling continues to
be a subject of great interest to the consumer movement even after
the enactment of the ineffectual Fair Packaging and Labeling Act.
Robert L. Birmingham analyzes the effects and defects of that Act,
the economic theory justifying it and other laws designed to ensure
consumers more complete and accurate information about the pro-
ducts they buy. 9 Although this analysis makes the economic theory
appear more forbidding than it is, such explicit reference to the eco-
nomic underpinning of reform legislation is welcome.
A research psychologist prepared the subsequent article which
is a tedious description of a study made of consumer reaction to de-
ceptive packaging, in which packages of different sizes contained the
same amount of goods.7" It would have been sufficient in a book of
such broad coverage to state the conclusions concisely: (1) that few
consumers detect the deception in packaging; and (2) that if the
merchant cheats too much, the consumer seems to prefer the smaller,
more nearly full package. Other than as an example of the type of
empirical research that can and should be done, such an article
wastes the reader's time. Although the results may be interesting,
it is difficult to see what they prove or how they can be of any use.
63 Note, Developments in the Law - Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1005
(1967).
64 Cohen, The Federal Trade Commission and the Regulation of Advertising in the
Consumer Interest, in AAKER & DAY 149.
65
,See ABA COMM. TO STUDY THE FTC (1969).
66 E. COX, R. FELLMETH & J. SCHULZ, THE NADER REPORT ON THE FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION (1969).
6 7 PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EXECUTIVE ORGANIZATION (ASH COUN-
CIL), A NEW REGULATORY FRAMEWORK - REPORT ON SELECTED INDEPENDENT
REGULATORY AGENCIES (1971).
68 One of the first results of the recent studies was the appointment of Miles W.
Kirkpatrick, the head of the ABA study, as the new Chairman of the FTC.
69 Birmingham, The Consumer as King: The Economics of Precarious Sovereignty, in
AAKER & DAY 169.
70 Naylor, Deceptive Packaging: Are the Deceivers Being Deceived, in AAKER &
DAY 184.
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Similar comments are applicable to the study, included later in the
book, which assesses dealer discounting of high and medium priced
automobiles. 7'
One of the few attempts at analysis in the book is found in the
editors' Introduction, where they suggest that the consumer's need
for greater information is not uniform throughout the marketplace.72
Complete and accurate information is critical for products which
are infrequently purchased, subject to rapid technological change,
likely to be used over a period of time, and whose performance
characteristics are not readily apparent. The consumer's need for
information becomes increasingly important as the marketing system
becomes more impersonal."3 In light of the material on packaging
and Kripke's article on the Federal Truth in Lending Act, it becomes
apparent that consumers also need assistance when it comes to math-
ematical calculations. Consequently, it is strange that the book does
not contain some discussion of the current efforts to aid the consumer
by persuading or requiring supermarkets to mark the unit price on
their goods."4 The possible alternative of standardized weights and
quantities is discussed favorably by Louis L. Stern in his business-
oriented article.75
The increasing need for data about performance standards is a
topic that is likely to get more attention in the future and is given
some treatment in Consumerism. Consumer's Union and other pri-
vate groups have been testing and reporting product performance
for some time, but their impact is slight. Suggestions that the Federal
Government get into the act have gotten nowhere, except for product
safety7" and the recent activity of the FDA regarding the efficacy
of drugs.77
In their third category of current consumer problems, "protec-
tion of the consumers against themselves and other consumers," the
editors combine two different concepts which they collectively label
"paternalism." The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act
71Jung, Price Policy and Discounts in the Medium and High-Priced Car Market, in
AAKER & DAY 211.
72 AAKER & DAY 8.
73 Stern, Consumer Protection Via Increased Information, in AAKER & DAY 94, 96-
74 See, e.g., N.Y. Times, July 21, 1970, at 45, col. 4.
75 See Stern, supra note 73.
7USee, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1964) (drugs); 15 U.S.C. § 1261(f) (1964)
(toys).
77 See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. Finch, 422 F. 2d 944 (6th Cir. 1970). Some consumer
product information compiled by the Federal Government for its own use has recently
been made public. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1970, § 1, at 18, col. 3.
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of 196678 illustrates features of both concepts. Minimum stan-
dards of safety for automobile tires protect the consumer from both
himself, and from others with whom he shares the roads. But as in
the case of performance standards unrelated to safety, the problem
is that the average consumer is not really capable of learning
whether the product he purchases is necessary or will meet his rea-
sonable expectations of performance. In any event, the extent to
which society should attempt to protect the consumer from himself
is no simple problem and is not subject to any single answer applica-
ble equally to rich and poor, or to textiles and prescription drugs.
Unfortunately, no attempt is made to analyze the problem in Con-
sumerism.
Related to the paternalism issues are the two articles on trading
stamps7" which simply suggest that trading stamps are, like adver-
tising and promotional games, merely a form of imperfect or monop-
olistic competition. But this is merely sidestepping the more funda-
mental questions, for trading stamps, advertising and promotional
games are all subject to serious questioning as uneconomical and
wasteful.
Consumerism also covers warranties and the problems peculiar to
the poor consumer. But except for three articles, the warranty section
is too over-simplified for a lawyer, and the articles are often incom-
plete, misleading, or out-of-date and are occasionally wrong. The
Report of the Task Force on Appliance Warranties and Service by
the FTC 0 is worthwhile because it offers an opportunity to under-
stand the manufacturer's problems and suggests the economic limita-
tions inherent in any reform proposals."- Also recommended is the
address by the vice president of Whirlpool Corporation which sug-
gests how a consumer products company can, in response to con-
sumer complaints, make their warranty both understandable and sat-
isfactory to the average consumer and at the same time be consistent
with corporate goals.8 2 If the program of simplified and amplified
7815 U.S.C. § 1381-1425 (Supp. III, 1966).
79 Bell, Liberty and Property, and No Stamps, in AAKER & DAY 235; Beem & Isaac-
son, Schizophrenia in Trading Stamp Analysis, in AAKER & DAY 248.
80 FTC, Report of the Task Force on Appliance Warranties and Service, in AAKER
& DAY 259.
81 The complexity of many consumer products and the shortage of trained repair-
men often make repairs uneconomical. No simple solution to the problem is apparent.
With respect to automobile warranty repairs, see the excellent article by Whitford, Law
and the Consumer Transactiop: A Case Study of the Automobile Warranty, 1968 WiS.
L. REV. 1006.
s2 Upton, The Use of Product Warranties and Guarantees as a Marketing Tool, in
AAKER & DAY 277.
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warranties works for Whirlpool,, then the consumer movement will
have achieved a significant victory. The 'Whirlpool article also
points out the problem of the uniformly' severe- warranty disclaimer
and other harsh provisions- found in the typical consumer sales con-
tract. The legal literature' on unbargained contracts and uncon-
scionable contract terms is enormous. This problem is amply dis-
cussed in-the materials discussed' earlier, but is not mentioned in
Consumerism.
Finally, the paper by the president of the Clark Equipment Cor-
poration should intrigue anyone interested in the developing law of
products liability.8 Although he bemoans the movement toward
strict liability and away from privity (which he calls "deterioration
in the law"), he accepts it and explains how the corporation must
act in order to live with these facts. He calls for close scrutiny of
all advertising claims by a responsible company official, greater con-
trol of salesmen's puffing,,and greater quality control in manufactur-
ing. ,His paper is strong evidence of the prophylactic impact of tort
liability, even when that liability is not founded upon traditional
notions of fault.
The last section of the book dealing with the case of the ghetto
consumer is uniformly good. It contains a portion of an excellent
law review Note that outlines the problems of the poor consumer.84
A more complete picture is found in the Caplovitz book mentioned
earlier, a portion* of which is also included here. This section also
contains a detailed summary of the FTC's Economic Report on In-
stallment Credit and Retail Sales, also mentioned'above. Finally,
it contains two articles describing studies that compare the relative
costs of food and other goods in the ghetto with those in middle-
class shopping areas.85 These and other available studies do not
agree in all respects, but one can reasonably conclude that the poor
probably pay more for goods and certainly for the credit they require.
The reasons for this are many, and the policy implications are com-
plex. Part of the problem stems from the fact that the poor are un-
skilled consumers and the stores in the ghetto are usually small, in-
efficiently run, and subject to extraordinary expenses due to theft and
high insurance rates. An additional problem is that the ability of
83 Schirmer, Products Liability and Reliability: The View from the President's Of-
fice, in AAKER & DAY 328.
84 Schnapper, Consumer Legislation and the Poor, in AAKER & DAY 339 (Omitted
by the editors is the law review author's provocative but flawed model statute).
8 5 Marcus, Similarity of Ghetto and Nonghetto Food Costs, in AAKER & DAY 382;
Sturdivant, Better Deal for Ghetto Shoppers, in AAKER & DAY 390.
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the poor to obtain goods of any kind is so tied up with their needs
and ability to get credit that the competition for their business is
limited to the neighborhood stores which are willing to extend credit
at high risks. In any event, it is clearly impossible to understand
the problem of the ghetto consumer while ignoring completely the
many problems of consumer credit, as Aaker and Day have done.
It is worth noting that guaranteeing the ghetto consumer all his
rights and protections is an important matter for all, not just those
professionally concerned with the poor or those with empathetic or
liberal impulses. As is pointed out, many of the ghetto consumers
are on welfare; the money they spend is ours. If only for selfish mo-
tives, we should assure ourselves that we get our money's worth.
The editors have collected a number of valuable articles. Their
bibliography at the end of the book gives citations to many more
articles and books. Both the book and the bibliography would have
been more useful if the first-rate and the poor, and the current and
the outdated, had not been included indiscriminately. The editors
have ignored entirely, or only suggested, many important topics, most
notably the critical area of consumer credit. It is also surprising that
two business professors would omit consideration of the better busi-
ness bureaus, trade associations, and other voluntary associations'
of businessmen and consumers who act outside the framework of
governmental authority to improve the ethical standards of merchants,
aid the lone consumer, and press for legislative reform. The ques-
tion of how legitimate and important a role such private agencies
will and should have in future consumer protection efforts deserves
more attention than it has received to date."
Although Consumerism does not contain enough to recommend
its purchase by many lawyers, it does offer some new material not
readily available in the conventional law texts and legal periodi-
cals. One hopes that there will be additional contributions by busi-
ness-oriented professionals and academics to the important issues of
consumerism.
SPENCER NETH
8 6 One of the most militant and successful groups is the Consumer's Education and
Protection Association which started in Philadelphia and has a chapter in Cleveland and
perhaps other cities. They get satisfaction for their consumer members principally by
picketing. Cleveland also has a group called the Consumer Protection Association which
is directed more at consumer education and lobbying for reform legislation.
87 For the only substantial piece available in the law reviews on the topic, see Note,
Extrajudicial Consumer Pressure: An Effective Impediment to Unethical Business Prac-
tices, 1969 DuKE L.J. 1011.
